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LEGISLATION
THE CORPORATE DEVICE AS A COVER FOR UsURY-AmENDMENT TO NEW YORK
- "
IzTFOsGENERAL BusINEss LAW, SECTION 374-CRPoRATIONs PnomBTr FrRo

ING ThE DEFENSE or UsuRY.-The use of the corporate device as a cover for usury
has recently been brought into the foreground of legal thought by the recent amendment to section 374 of the New York General Business Law and the events leading
to its enactment. A brief history and commentary on this point of law now seems
appropriate.
Usury, which originally simply meant any interest for the use of money but which now
has come to mean excessive interest, has been looked upon since earliest times with
abhorrence. Prohibitions or limitations which were found among the early laws of
the Chinese, Hindus, in the Koran, Mosaic law, Athenian law and the Twelve Tables
continued during the middle ages, when the taking of any interest was considered a
vice and contrary to the laws of God.' When commercial necessity during the Tudor
reign revived the previously limited practice of making loans at interest, it was
restricted by statutes which continued to proclaim its detestable nature.2 Excessive
interest remained illegal in England until the increasing amount and complexity of
commercial transactions resulted in such severe criticism of the usury statutes as
restrictions on economic development that the laws were made less and less severe
and were finally abolished in 1854.
The evil which was recognized in earlier history, when the taking of any interest
was forbidden, is the same evil which our laws today attempt to control while allowing a limited interest on the loan of money. This evil is not the fact that money is
lent with interest but that an individual is placed in a position where, as a necessitous
borrower, he may promise whatever interest or other monetary consideration or bonus
is demanded by the lender in order to obtain a loan and will usually, because of the
onerous interest requirements involved, be unable to free himself from debt. Our
public policy has dictated the enactment of legislation to protect the borrower from
extortion and oppression by unscrupulous persons who are ready to take undue advantage of the necessities of others. Experience has shown that a borrower's necessities
may create such an inequality between lender and borrower as to deprive the latter
of any freedom in contracting and place him at the mercy of unconscionable lenders.
An individual burdened with an excessive debt frequently is compelled to seek a further
series of larger loans in an ever increasing spiral until he reaches an impossible point
where he can no longer hope to repay them and he loses all his assets. In theory
then, the law places a borrower in the same legal category with persons under legal
liability to contract such as infants and persons non compos mentis, although we
will see that in practice not all borrowers qualify for this special protection.
The early colonial usury acts were modeled after the English acts, adopting the
penalty of the mother statutes which rendered a usurious contract wholly void. 4 In
their subsequent history the American statutes have also responded to the economic
influence and have become less and less severe. However, due to the differing degree
of such influence in various areas and the adoption of different methods to reach an
equitable balance between the economic influence and the social need to protect the
1. See State ex rel Embry v. Bynum, 243 Ala. 138, 9 So. 2d 134 (1942).
2. "And for as much as all usury, being forbidden by the law of God, is Sin and
Detestable." 13 Eliz. c. 8 (1561).
3. -Usury Laws Repeal Act, 17 & 18 Vict. c. 90 (1854).
4. See Plitt v. Kaufman, 188 AMd. 606, 53 A. 2d 673 (1947).
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individual, such statutes have reached a point of what appears to be great diversity.
In most jurisdictions today the usurious contract is unlawful or void only as to the
interest or as to so much of the interest as is in excess of the legal rate.5 In Rhode Island
we still find the entire usurious contract void but the interest rate allowed is thirty
percent on loans above $50.6 In many states the parties may agree in writing to pay
interest above the legal rate frequently as high as ten or twelve percent, and
Connecticut, where twelve percent may be orally agreed upon, has seen fit to exempt
mortgages above $500 from the operation of its usury statutes.8 A number of states
such as Maine, 9 Massachusetts' 0 and New Hampshire" have followed the English and
Canadian 12 course and abolished their usury laws. Of course, most states, whether
having liberal, severe, or no usury statutes, have realized the need of special legislation in certain types of loan transactions and consequently have enacted small loan
and banking laws.' 8 Statutewise, in the severe extreme we find several states,
including New York where the legal rate is a maximum of six percent, 14 where a
usurious contract remains void in its entirety' 5 and where under certain circumstances
a usurer may be subject to imprisonment.' 8
In 1850 the New York legislature, as a result of a case wherein a corporation
availed itself of the usury statutes to avoid a large obligation,' 7 passed the statute
which denies the defense of usury to a corporation.' 8 Although the purpose of the
statute was said to be the prevention of avoidance by corporations of their contracts, 10
judicial interpretation in New York as well as elsewhere, has generally regarded such
a statute as leaving the corporate borrower free to contract with lenders on whatever
terms it wishes.20 When we consider the basic evil which the statutes outlawing usury
were designed to counteract, i.e., to protect the necessitous individual borrower from
falling deeper and deeper into debt, it is obvious that, speaking generally, such evil
cannot exist in the case of the corporate borrower, where unlimited individual liability
5. See 6 Williston, Contracts § 1683 (rev. ed. 1938).
6. RI. Laws c. 485 §§ 2, 4 (1938).
7. Arkansas 10%, California 10%, Colorado 12%, Connecticut 12%, Florida 10%,
Kansas 10%, Montana 10%, New Mexico 12%, Oklahoma 10%, Oregon 10%, Texas
10%, Utah I0%, Washington 12%, Wisconsin 10%, Wyoming 10%.
8. Conn. Gen. Stats. § 6784 (1949).
9. Me. Rev. Stats. c. 55, § 204 (1944). No usury law except as to loans not exceeding
$300.
10. Mass. Gen. Laws c. 107, § 3 (1932).
11. N.H. Rev. Laws c. 367, § 1 (1942).
12. R.S.C. c. 156 (1952).
13. In New York see N.Y. Banking Law Art. IX (1932).
14. N.Y. General Business Law § 370 (1879). This rate is a reduction from the 7%
allowed prior to 1879.
15. N.Y. General Business Law § 373 (1837). But the New York courts generally will
apply the law of another state if the law of the other state is not as severe as that of
New York. See Short v. Taylor Maide Co., 271 App. Div. 464, 66 N.Y.S. 2d 245 (1st
Dep't 1946).
16. N.Y. Penal Law § 2400 (1904).
17. Dry Dock Bank v. American Life Ins. &Trust Co., 3 N.Y. 344 (1850).
18. N.Y. General Business Law § 374 (1955).
19. See Merchant's Exchange Nat'l Bank v. Commercial Warehouse Co., 49 N.Y. 635,
641 (1872).
20. See Hubbard v. Tod, 171 U.S. 474 (1898); MacQuoid v. Queens' Estate, 143 App.
Div. 134, 127 N.Y. Supp. 867 (2d Dep't 1911).
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is absent. The usual private business corporation, organized for profit, to succeed
must take financial risks. If it fails, it (in reality, its members) may lose its assets,
in which case it remains an empty shell and its members are free from individual
liability. To permit the corporation, which usually seeks profits in excess of the legal
rate of interest, to avoid an obligation on the ground of usury would indeed today be
an anachronism.
The full extent to which the corporate form may be used in connection with the
making of a loan, at a rate exceeding the rate of interest which may legally be
charged an individual, was not completely apparent until the decision of the Court
of Appeals in Jenkins v. Moyse.2 ' In this case Jenkins was in need of a loan to apply
to the mortgage debt upon his real estate. Upon consulting a broker, he was apparently told that the legal rate of six percent would not satisfy a prospective lender upon
a second mortgage, but that by incorporating with title to the mortgaged property
conveyed to the corporation, the corporation could obtain such a loan with the payment of a bonus. In behalf of the corporation to be formed, he authorized the broker
to negotiate the loan and defendant agreed to make a loan of $27,000 receiving a
second mortgage of $45,000 with interest at six percent. Jenkins formed the corporation, conveyed his real estate to it, and the corporation executed the second bond
and mortgage. Jenkins in no way became personally bound. After a foreclosure
action, in which he was denied a motion to vacate the sale and adjudicate that the
loan transactions were personal transactions between the parties, Jenkins brought an
action in equity to have the mortgage declared usurious and void. Findings had been
made in the courts below that the corporate form was used merely for the purpose
of concealing and covering up a corrupt, unlawful, and usurious loan made to the
plaintiff.2 The Court of Appeals, however, reversed, holding that it was not a
usurious loan nor an evasion of the statute but rather a compliance with a law that
left one way open for individuals to accomplish the result desired by both parties.
The unanimous decision of the court was, on the facts of the case, unquestionably
sound. Usury, as the New York statutes now prescribe, is the exaction of interest in
excess of the legal rate from an individual. Therefore, there can be no usury if the
individual is not legally bound to repay the loan. He can only become bound to repay
the loan if he personally executes the bond or note evidencing the loan. In Jenkins v.
Moyse the individual never became personally obligated to repay the loan. Only the
corporate borrower signed the bond or note. The evil which the usury statutes were
designed to eradicate was not present. It is true that Mr. Jenkins might lose his real
estate, as eventually he did, but at least he had the chance to "start fresh" free from a
burdensome debt.
But suppose the transaction took a form whereby Air. Jenkins remained personally
obligated to pay the debt, ie., a deficiency judgment which might result from the
inadequacy of the security? In such a case it might be argued that the corporate form
was merely used as a cover for usury. Judge Lehman probably had this in mind when
he wrote: "The test of whether this loan is usurious is whether it was in fact made
to the plaintiff. Doubtless at times loans are made in fact to an individual though in
form they are made to a corporation to hide the fact that the lender has exacted an
illegal rate of interest from the real borrower. We do not now deal with such a situation. Here the corporation was formed and the loan made to it, rather than to the
individual who owned the corporate stock. ... He did not in his inditidual capacity
borrow any money or agree to repay any money....
We do not now decide whether
21. 254 N.Y. 319, 172 N.E. 521 (1930).
22. 229 App. Div. 743, 241 N.Y. Supp. 901 (2d Dep't 1930), rev'd, 254 N.Y. 319, 172
N.E. 521 (1930).
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the plaintiff would be bound by the judgment if the contract had been tainted with
2 3

usury."

Although the above qualification must be considered dictum, it certainly calls out
strongly for a limitation of the actual holding to the precise facts of the case. Some
possible factors which the court might have considered as being outside the holding
of the case, are: (1) negotiation and agreement by the money lender with the individual upon the loan prior to the formation of the corporation. But in Kings Mercantile Co. v. Cooper,2 4 where the court, after saying that the defendant had been
compelled by plaintiff to incorporate to avoid the effect of the usury statutes, said
that "this is precisely what is permitted by Jenkins v. Moyse. .. .";25 (2) payment
of the proceeds of the loan to, or its repayment by, the individual rather than the
corporation. But in Werger v. Haines Corp.,20 the individual repayed the loans herself
and in In Matter of the Bank of New York and Fifth Ave. Bank27 a portion of the
proceeds of the loan was paid directly to the individual, yet these loans were not held
to be usurious; (3) personal use of the proceeds of the loan for purposes not beneficial to the corporation. But in Kings Mercantile Co. v. Cooper the court held that
use of the proceeds of the loan to discharge a mortgage upon the individual defendant's property was immaterial and did not compel a finding that the loan was made
to the individual. Also in the Werger case, the proceeds of the loan were turned over
by the debtor corporation as a mere conduit to the individual to use in the operation
of another business not connected with that of the debtor corporation and in In
Matter of the Bank of New York there was also personal use of the proceeds of the
loan by the individual; (4) where the individual becomes in some form also liable
and thereby voids the limited liability purpose of corporate formation. Herein is the
truly distinguishing factor; individual liability and the consequent evil which our
usury statutes were enacted to overcome. The policy of our New York law which
is intended to protect an individual from usury appears to be frustrated when an individual becomes personally obligated to repay a loan at a usurious rate of interest
where the loan appears to be made to the individual as evidenced not only by his
personal obligation to repay the loan but also by the fact that the proceeds thereof
are for his personal benefit, even though the corporate device may be interposed to
act as a conduit or nominal mortgagor.
Perhaps the nearest approximation to the situation seemingly indicated by Judge
Lehman's dictum in Jenkins v. Moyse was disclosed in the case of Werger v. Haines
Corp. Here plaintiff, in an action on promissory notes and to foreclose mortgage
securities, moved for summary judgment on the pleadings. Defendant's answer alleged
that the corporate defendant was organized in 1945 to import and sell foreign cars
but that it had been divested of its authority to engage in that business prior to July,
1947 when the individual defendant, who operated another business of buying and
selling domestic automobiles, and her agent applied to plaintiff for a loan. It was
agreed that the defunct corporation would serve as the vehicle for the loan and the
defendant transferred certain assets to the corporation to which the loan was made
and paid a substantial bonus with the individual defendant signing as indorser. The
23. 254 N.Y. 319, 324, 172 N.E. 521, 522 (1930) (Emphasis added.).
24. 199 Misc. 381, 100 N.Y.S. 2d 754 (Sup. Ct. 1950). Discussed later in the text.
25. Id. at 383, 100 N.Y.S. 2d at 756.
26. 94 N.Y.S. 2d 691 (Sup. Ct. 1950), afO'd, 277 App. Div. 1108, 101 N.Y.S. 2d 361
(1st Dep't 1950), aff'd, 302 N.Y. 930, 100 N.E. 2d 189 (1951). Discussed later in the text.
27. 126 N.YL.J., No. 105, p. 1478, col. 1 (Surr. Ct. 1951), aff'd as modified, 280 App.
Div. 947, 116 N.Y.S. 2d 57 (2d Dep't 1952), aff'd, 305 N.Y. 764, 113 N.E. 2d 154 (1953).
Discussed later in the text.
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loan was not beneficial to the defendant corporation as the proceeds thereof were
turned over to the individual defendant who used it to conduct her domestic car
business. The individual defendant repaid the loan and others were executed in the
same manner. The trial court granted the motion, citing Jenkins v. Moyse as determinative of the issues. In the Appellate Division the judgment was affirmed by a
three to two court. The dissenting opinion presents a plea for the narrower construction of the Jenkins decision: ". . . [T]he present answer does state in detail the
evidentiary facts on which the defense of usury depends. It . . . sets forth . . . the
matters which would appear to entitle her and the other defendants to defend at a
trial . . . That J. Valorie Haines and not Haines Corp. repaid the previous loans
that had been made. That would appear to be a decisive fact.. .,-s After stating
the facts, the opinion continues: ". . . J. Valorie Haines assigned certain chattels to
Haines Corp.. . . she never transferred the business to Haines corporation but continued to operate it herself and thus used the loans made by plaintiffs to further her
individual purposes. ' 9 Stating that J. Valorie Haines indorsed the notes and chattel
mortgage and the proceeds were immediately paid by the corporation to her, the
minority opinion concluded thereby that she became the primary obligor. Then
Justice Van Voorhis very ably distinguishes the Jenkins case: . . . [B]ut the facts
of that case are different. It involves a loan at more than legal interest to liquidate
a mortgage and other liens upon real property which had been owned previously by
an individual but had been transferred to the corporation to which the loan was made.
Unlie the present case, the proceeds of the loan were expended to serve the purposes
:
of the corporation by extinguishing liens upon what had then become its real estate."ZO
He goes on to state that plaintiff knew the funds were not to be used by Haines
Corporation; that the loan was made to it as a conduit to conceal the fact that the
money was really being borrowed by an individual and therefore, "this case comes
within the distinction drawn in Jenkins v. Moyse .... The distinction drawn by
Justice Cuff in Sherling v. Galhtin Improvement Co. (145 Misc. 734, 735) is valid
here: 'In the Jenkinr case the corporation was formed expressly to make the loan.
Here the corporation was formed to conceal the loan agreed to be made to the individual! . . . It may be true as Justice Cuff adds, that 'only the uninitiated fal to
escape' the requirements of the usury laws, and that plaintiffs here might have brought
themselves within the Jenkins rule if they had required J. Valorie Haines to assign
her auto business to the corporation, with the consequence that the proceeds of the
loan would have been used for a corporate purpose. .

.

. The tendency to limit the

application of the usury laws should not be indulged to the extent of altering and
confusing customary rules governing commercial transactions and relationships." 3'
The evidence of an individual transaction could hardly be any stronger than in
this case, but the Court of Appeals nevertheless affirmed the order granting the motion
for summary judgment with no opinion, citing only Jenkins v. Moyse and N.Y. Credit
Men's Ass' v. ManufacturersDiscount Corp.am In neither of the cited cares was the
individual personally obligated as in the Werger case.
28. Werger N. Haines Corp., 277 App. Div. 1103, 1109, 101 N.Y.S. 2d 361, 363 (1st
Dep't 1950), aff'd, 302 N.Y. 930, 100 N.E. 2d 189 (1951).
29. Ibid.
30. Ibid.
31. Id. at 1112, 101 N.Y.S:'2d at 366.
32. 298 N.Y. 512, 80 N.E. 2d 660 (1948). This was a suit wherein a trustee In bankruptcy applied to have loan transactions declared usurious and to direct an accounting upon
merchandise pledged by the corporation of which the bankrupt was the sole stockholder
and guarantor.
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The lower courts for many years before the Jenkins case had declared loans such

as there involved, usurious. 33 Since that decision the lower courts have occasionally

referred to Judge Lehman's qualification, 4 yet in the case of Kings Mercantile Co. v.
Cooper, a lower court said: "And where a borrower and a lender desire to effect a
loan at a rate of interest in excess of the legal rate, it has been held entirely valid
for the borrower to incorporate even though such act is solely for the purpose of
taking the loan in the name of a corporation. Apparently in this situation form prevails over substance." (citing Jenkins v. Moyse).85 Further, the court states: "The
defendant seeks to differentiate the cited case factually [from Jenkins v. Moyse]
because there the debtor conveyed the real property to a corporation and the corporation executed the bond and mortgage, whereas here the bond and mortgage were
executed and delivered by the individual defendant as collateral security. This is a
distinction without a difference. Security may be furnished by a guarantor as well as
by a borrower." 30

In In Matter of the Bank of New York and Fifth Ave. Bank, the bank was trustee
under a will by which Mrs. W. was given a remainder, contingent upon her surviving
her grandmother who was at this time eighty-one years old and dying of cancer. Mrs.
W., in need of a personal loan, assigned a portion of her remainder in the trust
valued at $105,000 to the Waterous Lumber Co., which was wholly owned by her
husband, ostensibly to enable the corporation to obtain a loan by using the assignment
as collateral. The assignment stated that the corporation was in need of financial
assistance and might use the assignment as collateral but that Mrs. W. shall not be
liable for any deficiency. The lumber company on the same day re-assigned this
contingent interest to the lender to secure a $33,000 loan made by the lender to the
corporation. Two weeks later the lender loaned the corporation an additional $32,000
which was also secured by Mrs. W's assigned interest in the trust. The lender was
to be entitled to the entire $105,000 when and if the contingency occurred, but if
Mrs. W. predeceased her grandmother the corporation was not to be liable for the
loans. The grandmother died two months later and the lender demanded $105,000
from the corpus of the trust. In this accounting Mrs. W. filed objections to payment
on the ground that these advances made by the respondent, constituted loans to Mrs.
W. and consequently were usurious and void. The referee found as a fact that Mrs.
W. had authorized the corporation to pledge her interest only for the actual amounts
loaned plus the legal rate of interest but in a dictum he went on to say that in his
opinion, the loan would be usurious and unconscionable if liability were not so limited.
The referee stated in support of his dictum: "All agree that where the defense of
usury is interposed, the substance of the transaction and not its form must
govern. . . ... and proceeded to distinguish Jenkins v. Moyse on the ground that here,
despite the statement of corporate need in the assignment, the money was not used
33. See Jenkins v. Moyse, 229 App. Div. 743, 241 N.Y. Supp. 901 (2d Dep't 1930),
rev'd, 254 N.Y. 319, 172 N.E. 521 (1930); Anam Realty Co. v. Delaney Garage, Inc., 190
App. Div. 745, 180 N.Y. Supp. 297 (1st Dep't 1920); Fort v. Central Park West Corp.,
131 Misc. 774, 227 N.Y. Supp. 351 (Sup. Ct. 1928); First Nat'l Bank v. American Near
East and Black Sea Lines, 119 Misc. 650, 197 N.Y. Supp. 856 (Sup. Ct. 1922).
34. Werger v. Haines Corp., 277 App. Div. 1108, 101 N.Y.S. 2d 361 (1st Dep't 1950)
(dissenting opinion); In the Matter of the Bank of New York and Fifth Ave. Bank, 126
N.Y.L.J. 1478, col. I (Sup. Ct. 1951) (dictum); Sherling v. Gallatin Improvement Co., 145
Misc. 734, 260 N.Y. Supp. 229 (Sup. Ct. 1932).
35. 199 Misc. 381, 382, 100 N.Y.S. 2d 754, 755 (Sup. Ct. 1950).
36. Id. at 383, 100 N.Y.S. 2d at 756 (Emphasis added.)
37. 126 N.Y.L.J. No. 105, p. 1478, col. 3 (Surr. Ct. 1951).
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for its benefit but rather by the individual. Further, a portion of the money was
actually paid directly to Mrs. W. and the corporation was not even to be liable on
the loans.
In the Appellate Division where the referee's judgment was amended to provide
that the objections of irs. W. be dismissed and the assignee be paid out of the
interest of the objectant in accordance with the terms of the assignments, the court
said: "It was conceded that the assignments would be payable only by the estate,
and then only in the event said remainderman survived the life tenant, and that
neither the corporation nor said remainderman could be held liable in any event;
and it was so understood by all the parties. Therefore said transactions were not
loans to the remainderman and are not usurious on that account ...and there was
no duress by force of circumstances; it being established that objectant bad a com9
bined annual income of $37,000 from her grandfather's and her mother's estate."3
The court appears to have recognized that there was no individual liability nor force
of circumstances present and so the decision is in accord with the theory of our
usury law. The Court of Appeals affirmed with no opinion.3
The amendment to section 374 of the New York General Business Law4o during
the 1955 session of the legislature was prompted by a situation particularly prevalent
in Queens County where certain Long Island money-lenders were reported as having
had a $12,000,000 business per year on second mortgage loans with at least 8000 small
homeowners obtaining short term loans requiring interest reportedly as high as 65
percent.4 1 The lenders secured themselves against the charge of usury merely by
having the borrowers incorporate prior to making the loan and a grand jury called
to investigate the situation found that under the judicial decisions, no crime had been
committed. Section 374 of the General Business Law now allows the defense of
usury to a corporation whose principal asset is the ownership of a one or two family
dwelling where it appears that the corporation was organized within a period of six
months prior to the corporation's execution of a mortgage on the one or two family
dwelling. If the individual necessitous borrower is to be protected, as our public
policy appears to demand, this amendment does not go far enough. This protection
should not be limited only to the owners of one and two family dwellings and for
only a six month period. Further, it appears that within a few months of its enactment, other loopholes were found and several operators have resumed the practices
which the amendment was designed to stop.l
CONCLUSION
Judge Lehman's dictum in the case of Jenkins v. Moyse, which was apparently
designed to limit the effect of the decision in that case to the important fact that
38. 280 App. Div. at 947, 116 N.Y.S. 2d at 59.
39. 305 N.Y. 764, 113 N.E. 2d 154 (1953).
40. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1955, c. 673. Section 374 of the General Business Law now reads:
"Corporations prohibited from interposing defense of usury. No corporation hall hereafter
interpose the defense of usury in any action. The term corporation, as used in this section,
shall be construed to include all associations, and joint-stock companies having any of the
powers and privileges of corporations not possessed by individuals or partnerships. The
provisions of this section shall not apply to a corporation, the principal aset of which
shall be the ownership of a one or two family dwelling, where it appears that the said
corporation was organized and created within a period of six months prior to the execution,
by said corporation of a bond or note evidencing indebtedness, and a mortgage creating a
lien for said indebtedness on the said one or two family dwelling."
41. Long Island Star Journal, Feb. 14, 1955, p. 1, col 4; April 27, 1955, p. 7, col. 5.
42. New York Tnes, Nov. 18, 1955, p. 23, col 1.
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there was there involved a really corporate transaction, appears to have been either
ignored or disapproved of by our Court of Appeals. The result has been to permit
the utilization of the corporate entity at times as a cover for loans to individual
borrowers at a usurious rate of interest. Such a situation by itself would seem to
call for a legislative clarification of the distinction between a truly corporate loan and
one to an individual borrower. In additiofi the situation of the necessitous small
homeowner borrower, who may be willing to mortgage his principal possession at any
rate of interest or bonus, whether or not he becomes personally obligated, to secure a
loan, demands truly effective legislation rather than the limited improvisation which
the legislature enacted in 1955.
A new and enlightened approach to the use of the corporate device in loan transactions is in order.

